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PROPERTY LAW
Michael V. Hernandez*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys judicial and legislative developments in
Virginia property law since the last Survey article on this topic
was published,1 with primary emphasis on developments from
June 1, 1998 to June 1, 2000. Although there were interesting de-
velopments in several areas of property law, the most important
developments arose in the Supreme Court of Virginia's decisions
involving covenants, servitudes, and easements. A significant
portion of this article will explain and analyze those decisions.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Covenants, Servitudes and Easements
1. Overview of Virginia's Unique Approach
The Supreme Court of Virginia's recent opinions regarding
covenants, servitudes and easements make this inherently diffi-
cult area of law more complex and are somewhat inconsistent
with generally accepted principles in most jurisdictions. Attor-
neys practicing in this area of law should avoid relying on general
property law sources without being familiar with the unique fea-
tures of Virginia law.
* Associate Professor, Regent University School of Law. B.A., with High Distinction,
University of Virginia; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law. I am very grateful for
the editorial assistance provided by my wife, Laura Hernandez, Esquire, the research and
drafting assistance provided by Grady Palmer, and the secretarial assistance provided by
Kendra Jarrell.
1. Susan M. Pesner & Martin C. Conway, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Property
Law, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1145 (1997).
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a. Covenants Running with the Land
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently addressed the two dis-
tinct restrictive covenants recognized by Virginia law, "'the com-
mon law doctrine of covenants running with the land and restric-
tive covenants in equity known as equitable easements and
servitudes."'2 Regarding covenants running with the land at law,
the court has required that the party seeking to enforce the cove-
nant show:
(1) privity between the original parties to the covenant (horizontal
privity); (2) privity between the original parties and their successors
in interest (vertical privity); (3) an intent by the original covenanting
parties that the benefits and the burdens of the covenant will run
with the land; (4) that the covenant "touches and concerns" the land;
and (5) the covenant.., be in writing.3
These requirements track the traditionally accepted elements
for a real covenant, which is a covenant enforceable at law, typi-
cally by the imposition of money damages.4 By contrast, an equi-
table servitude involves slightly different criteria and is tradition-
ally considered a covenant that is enforceable at equity, generally
by injunction.'
2. Sonoma Dev. Inc. v. Miller, 258 Va. 163, 167, 515 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1999) (quoting
Sloan v. Johnson, 254 Va. 271, 274-75, 491 S.E.2d 725, 727 (1997)).
3. Id. (citing Sloan, 254 Va. at 276, 491 S.E.2d at 728).
4. See generally ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.21 (2d ed.
1993).
5. Real covenants and equitable servitudes share two requirements, intent and touch
and concern. Id. §§ 8.15 to -.16, 8.24 to -.25. The original covenanting parties must intend
for the covenant to run with the land and bind successors in interest, and the covenant
must affect the use and enjoyment of land on both the benefit and burden side and thus
may not affect the parties solely in their private interests. Id. Real covenants and equita-
ble servitudes historically have had different requirements regarding privity of estate and
writing. Id. §§ 8.13 to -.31. Under the traditional approach to real covenants, two forms of
privity are required. Id. §§ 8.17 to -.18. The original covenanting parties must be in hori-
zontal privity, which means that the covenant must be created as part of a transaction in-
volving a conveyance of an estate in land between the same parties. Id. § 8.18. Moreover,
all successors in interest must be in vertical privity with an original party to the covenant,
which at law means that the successor must receive his predecessor's full interest in the
subject land and be able to trace his chain of title back to an original covenanting party.
Id. § 8.17. The modern trend has been to eliminate the horizontal privity requirement and
thus require only vertical privity. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Bell, 516 A.2d 1028, 1037 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1986); see generally CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 4, § 8.18. However, Vir-
ginia law still requires both horizontal and vertical privity. Sloan, 254 Va. at 276, 491
S.E.2d at 728. For an equitable servitude to exist and be enforceable against a successor in
interest, horizontal privity traditionally is not required. The successor must simply take a
portion of the predecessor's estate and thus does not have to receive the predecessor's full
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Because the elements the supreme court has required for cove-
nants running with the land at law track those traditionally re-
quired for real covenants, it might be assumed that this type of
covenant is simply a traditional real covenant. However, three re-
cent cases demonstrate otherwise.
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia applied
the law of covenants running with the land at law even though
equitable relief alone was sought and ultimately granted.6 The
court also required the party seeking equitable relief to show that
horizontal privity exists between the original covenanting par-
ties,7 a requirement traditionally not imposed for covenants to
run in equity.8
In two of these cases, the court referred broadly to the concept
at issue as "covenants running with the land at law,"9 while in
the most recent case, the court, for the first time, used the phrase
"restrictive covenant," despite the fact that the case arose solely
in equity." Therefore, it appears that the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia uses "covenants running with the land at law" and "restric-
tive covenant" to encompass the traditional concepts of both real
covenants and equitable servitudes.
b. Equitable Servitudes
The above interpretation of the Supreme Court of Virginia's
decisions may seem inconsistent with the court's reference to the
second type of restrictive covenants, those "in equity known as
equitable easements and servitudes."" Upon close review, how-
ever, it appears that the court's use of this second category does
not refer to the common definition of an equitable servitude, but
interest to meet the vertical privity requirement. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 4, §
8.26.
6. Sonoma Dev., 258 Va. at 165-70, 515 S.E.2d at 578-81; Waynesboro Vill., L.L.C. v.
BMC Props., 255 Va. 75, 78-84, 496 S.E.2d 64, 67-70 (1998); Sloan, 254 Va. at 274-77, 491
S.E.2d at 727-29.
7. Sonoma Dev., 258 Va. at 167, 515 S.E.2d at 579; Waynesboro Vill., 255 Va. at 81,
496 S.E.2d at 68; Sloan, 254 Va. at 276-77, 491 S.E.2d at 728.
8. CUNNINGHAM, ETAL., supra note 4, § 8.26.
9. Waynesboro Vill., 255 Va. at 81, 496 S.E.2d at 68; Sloan, 254 Va. at 274-75, 491
S.E.2d at 727.
10. Sonoma Dev., 258 Va. at 167, 515 S.E.2d at 579.
1L Id. at 167, 515 S.E.2d at 579 (quoting Sloan, 254 Va. at 274-75, 491 S.E.2d at
727).
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rather to a more narrow concept that is similar to what is com-
monly known as an implied equitable servitude or reciprocal
negative easement. Although most jurisdictions do not enforce im-
plied covenants at law, 2 most jurisdictions recognize implied
covenants in equity. 3 This implied equitable servitude or recipro-
cal negative easement exists when a common grantor or subdi-
vider begins to implement a scheme of development upon which a
purchaser relies, but the grantor neglects or refuses to impose a
restriction on one or more lots encompassed within the scheme.
An implied servitude can be imposed against all lots within the
scheme, even those that have no restrictions in their chain of ti-
tle. 14
The Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion in Sloan v. Johnson5
demonstrates that the second type of restrictive covenant recog-
nized in Virginia is not synonymous with the traditional concept
of an equitable servitude. In Sloan, the supreme court indicated
that equitable easements or servitudes apply only in cases in-
volving a common grantor who develops parcels of land with a
general scheme. 6 Although the court in Sloan did not specifically
address whether servitudes can be implied, its limitation of equi-
table servitudes to cases involving schemes is similar to the con-
cept of an implied equitable servitude or implied reciprocal nega-
tive easement recognized in most jurisdictions. 7
12. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 4, § 8.31.
13. Id. A leading case establishing implied reciprocal negative easements is Sanborn
v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925). In Sanborn, the defendant began construction of a
gasoline station on property he owned because there were no restrictions in his deed or
chain of title. Id. at 496-97. The Supreme Court of Michigan enjoined the construction of
the station because the defendant "could not [have] avoid[ed] noticing the strictly uniform
residence character given the lots by the expensive dwellings, thereon, and the least in-
quiry would have quickly developed the fact that [the lot] was subjected to a reciprocal
negative easement." Id. at 498. But see Sprague v. Kimball, 100 N.E. 622 (Mass. 1913)
(holding that a burden cannot be imposed by implication and must be in writing).
14. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 4, § 8.32. The courts that have rejected this the-
ory have done so based on a strict application of the Statute of Frauds and the notion that
it is not fair to burden a party who obtained a deed conveying an unrestricted fee. See, e.g.,
Sprague, 100 N.E. at 624.
15. 254 Va. 271, 491 S.E.2d 725 (1997).
16. Id. at 275-76, 491 S.E.2d at 727-28 (citing Mid-State Equip. Co. v. Bell, 217 Va.
133, 140-41, 225 S.E.2d 877, 884 (1976)). The court specifically held that it need not con-
sider whether a general scheme existed to establish an equitable servitude if it was first
shown that a covenant running with the land was present. Id. at 276, 491 S.E.2d at 728.
This was so even though the plaintiff was seeking equitable relief and not damages. Id. at
274-77, 491 S.E.2d at 727-29.
17. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, in Sonoma Development, Inc. v. Miller,"8 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia noted without explanation that the doc-
trine of equitable servitudes does not apply to a case involving a
restriction on one lot.'9 Apparently, the majority assumed that a
case involving a restriction on only one lot could not, by defini-
tion, involve a scheme for development of a residential neighbor-
hood. Therefore, the case did not fit within the traditional under-
standing of an implied equitable servitude or reciprocal negative
easement. Because Sonoma Development involved a claim to en-
force a covenant against a successor in interest in equity, the tra-
ditional approach to equitable servitudes would have governed
had the court applied it2 ° Nevertheless, the court held that the
Virginia doctrine of equitable servitude did not apply and re-
solved the case solely on the law of covenants running with the
land or real covenants.2
c. Implied Easements
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently held in Prospect Devel-
opment Co. v. Bershade2 2 that a purchaser's detrimental reliance
on representations that the builder preserve land adjacent to the
purchaser's lot gave rise to an implied easement by estoppel.23 Al-
though this approach is consistent with the traditional view of
negative easements, it is inconsistent with the modern trend that
considers such an interest to be an implied equitable servitude.
Historically, easements have included both the right to use the
land of another and the right to insist that the owner of another
tract not engage in certain activities on his land.' The latter
form, commonly known as a negative easement, frequently in-
volves such rights as unobstructed scenic views or the preserva-
tion of adjacent land in its natural state.25 Because a negative
easement is virtually identical to a restrictive covenant, modern
courts and commentators have increasingly classified negative
easements as restrictive covenants and thus used "easement"
18. 258 Va. 163, 515 S.E.2d 577 (1999).
19. Id. at 165-67, 515 S.E.2d at 578-79.
20. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
21. Sonoma Dev., 258 Va. at 167, 515 S.E.2d at 579.
22. 258 Va. 75, 515 S.E.2d 291 (1999).
23. Id. at 87-90, 515 S.E.2d at 297-300.
24. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 4, § 8.1.
25. Id. § 8.1.
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only to refer to a right of use on another's land." Thus, most ju-
risdictions consider the interest that arises where purchasers rely
on representations later dishonored by the sellers as an implied
servitude, rather than an implied easement." Indeed, in Prospect
Development Co., three justices noted in a partial dissent that the
oral promises technically involved a restrictive covenant rather
than an easement.28
2. Restrictive Covenant Cases
In Sloan v. Johnson,29 the Supreme Court of Virginia enforced
a restrictive covenant against a property owner who claimed the
covenant was unenforceable because it was not part of a general
neighborhood scheme.3 ° Sloan involved three adjoining lots in
Arlington County which each had a restriction in its chain of title
restricting the lot to one residence."' The primary defendants, the
Johnsons, owned a lot located between the two plaintiffs' lots.
3 2
When the Johnsons made plans to subdivide their lot to include
two residences, the adjacent landowners sued to enforce the one-
residence restriction.33 The Johnsons argued that the original re-
strictions, which were limited to three lots, were not part of a
general neighborhood scheme and thus were not enforceable as
an equitable servitude.34 Never reaching the Johnsons' argument,
the court instead held that the restriction in the Johnsons' deed
met the five-part test for a covenant running with the land and
was, therefore, enforceable in equity regardless of whether it con-
stituted an equitable servitude. 5
Although the holding in Sloan might be correct under the doc-
trine of covenants running with the land, the court failed to recite
sufficient facts to support its conclusion that one plaintiff was en-
26. Id.; see also JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLEs OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 387 (3d ed. 1989).
27. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses § 5 (1996).
28. Prospect Dev. Co., 258 Va. at 96 n.5, 515 S.E.2d at 303 n.5 (Carrico, C.J., Kinser &
Lacy, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. 254 Va. 271, 491 S.E.2d 725 (1997).
30. Id. at 274, 491 S.E.2d at 727.
31. Id. at 273-74, 491 S.E.2d at 726-27.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 274-76, 491 S.E.2d at 727-28.
35. Id. at 276-77, 491 S.E.2d at 728-29.
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titled to the relief granted. To enforce a covenant against a land-
owner, the plaintiff must be either an original party to the cove-
nant or a successor in interest to an original covenanting party. 36
By definition, a party who owns a lot that was sold prior to the
creation of the covenant in interest cannot be a successor in in-
terest to that covenant.37 In Sloan, the first lot, currently owned
by the plaintiffs Abel and Taylor as trustees, was initially con-
veyed in 1934 with the restriction." The Johnsons' lot was ini-
tially conveyed, with the same restriction, on an unspecified date
in 1934.3' The third lot, currently owned by the Sloans, was ini-
tially conveyed with the same restriction in 1936.40 The court did
not disclose whether the Johsons' lot was conveyed before or af-
ter the Abel/Taylor lot. If the Johnsons' lot was initially conveyed
later in 1934 than the lot conveyed to the predecessor of Abel and
Taylor, then Abel and Taylor technically were not in vertical
privity with regard to the Johnsons' covenant and thus would not
be entitled to enforce the covenant.
To illustrate, assume 0 owns a tract of land that he subdivides
into three lots and sells to A, B and C, respectively. When 0 sells
the first lot to A, the transaction can be diagrammed horizontally,
like this:
0-*A
When 0 later conveys his interest in the last two lots to B and
C, their relationship to the transaction between 0 and A can be
diagrammed vertically, like this:
O-*A
B&C
(one lot each)
Similar diagrams can be made for the transactions between 0
and B and 0 and C. When 0 conveys the second lot to B, 0 only
retains title to the third lot, since he has already conveyed the
36. CUNNINGHAM ETAL., supra note 4, §§ 8.13 to -.18.
37. Id.
38. Sloan, 254 Va. at 273-74, 491 S.E.2d at 726-27.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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first lot to A. Thus, the transactions regarding B's lot can be dia-
grammed like this:
O- B
C
When 0 conveys the third and final lot to C, he retains no land
and thus has no successor in interest. Thus, the transaction re-
garding the third lot can be diagrammed like this:
0->C
As these diagrams illustrate, both B and C are in vertical priv-
ity with an original party to the covenant restricting A's lot. How-
ever, only C is in vertical privity with an original party to the
covenant restricting B's lot, and no one is in vertical privity with
an original party to C's covenant. Most importantly, A is not in
vertical privity with regard to the covenants restricting either of
his neighbors' lots.
Likewise, in Sloan, if the lot owned by Abel and Taylor was ini-
tially conveyed earlier in 1934 than the lot owned by Johnson,
then Abel and Taylor were not in vertical privity regarding the
covenant binding the Johnsons' lot and thus technically could not
sue to enforce it. Other jurisdictions have avoided this problem by
allowing all lot owners within a scheme to enforce the covenant
against each other without regard to the technical existence of
vertical privity.41 This issue ultimately would not have affected
the outcome in Sloan. The lot owned by the other plaintiffs, the
Sloans, was initially conveyed after the lot currently owned by
the Johnsons was initially conveyed. Accordingly, the Sloans were
in vertical privity with regard to the Johnsons' covenant and thus
could enforce the covenant in equity. Nonetheless, this issue
could be dispositive in a future case that involves only one plain-
tiff who owns a lot that was initially conveyed before the defen-
dant's lot was initially conveyed. If this issue arises in the future,
the court should clarify the law regarding vertical privity in such
cases.
41. See, e.g., Snow v. Van Dam, 197 N.E. 224, 228 (Mass. 1935); see generally
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 4, § 8.33; CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 383. In-
terestingly, in Snow, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts imposed an implied
beneficiary theory despite previously rejecting the notion of an implied reciprocal negative
easement. Sprague v. Kimball, 100 N.E. 622, 624 (Mass. 1913).
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Another covenant case, Waynesboro Village, L.L.C. v. BMC
Properties,42 involved reciprocal covenants not to compete in
deeds involving two commercial tracts.' The original covenanting
parties were BMC and Waynesboro Village's ("Waynesboro")
predecessor, Shenandoah Village ("Shenandoah")." Shenandoah
contracted to sell a lot to BMC.45 Because BMC planned to build a
motel on its lot, it insisted that Shenandoah agree not to use its
adjacent lot for competitive purposes.46 In consideration for this
covenant, BMC reciprocally agreed not to use its lot to compete
with the businesses Shenandoah maintained on its adjacent
property." The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")
later obtained title to Shenandoah's property and conveyed it to
Waynesboro.' Waynesboro sought a declaration that the cove-
nant not to compete was unenforceable against it for several rea-
sons.49 First, Waynesboro argued that the covenant was ambigu-
ous and thus unenforceable because it could restrict Waynes-
boro's use of its property even if BMC never built a motel on the
lot. ° The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this contention,
holding that the covenant unambiguously imposed reciprocal ob-
ligations not to compete with businesses on the other lot.51 Sec-
ond, Waynesboro argued that BMC should be equitably estopped
from enforcing the covenant because BMC had not yet built the
motel even though more than seven years had elapsed since the
covenant was imposed.5" The court also rejected this argument,
noting that Waynesboro could not reasonably rely on BMC's inac-
tion because the covenants were a matter of public record, and
BMC had not engaged in any fraudulent or deceptive conduct
that harmed Waynesboro 3
42. 255 Va. 75, 496 S.E.2d 64 (1998).
43. Id. at 77, 496 S.E.2d at 66.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 77-78, 496 S.E.2d at 66.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 78, 496 S.E.2d at 66.
49. Id. at 78-79, 496 S.E.2d at 66-67.
50. Id. BMC had not built a motel on the lot in the more than seven years since the
covenant was imposed. Id. at 81, 496 S.E.2d at 68. However, BMC had spent $350,000 to
purchase its lot and more than $93,000 on plans for construction. Id. at 78, 496 S.E.2d at
67.
51. Id. at 79-80, 496 S.E.2d at 67-68.
52. Id. at 81-82, 496 S.E.2d at 68.
53. Id. The court similarly rejected Waynesboro's reliance on a federal doctrine de-
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In Sonoma Development, Inc. v. Miller,54 the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that the horizontal privity requirement was met
even though an original party was not named in the document
that created the covenant.55 Rather than including the covenant
in the deed of conveyance, the grantor drafted the documents
separately, and the grantee was not named in the covenant
agreement.56 The party burdened by the covenant argued that the
horizontal privity requirement was not met because horizontal
privity was not demonstrated by the deed of conveyance. 57 The
court rejected this argument, holding that horizontal privity is
present whenever the covenant is made in connection with a con-
veyance of an estate, even if the transaction is not completed in
one document. 8
3. Implied Easement Cases
In Carter v. County of Hanover,59 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that a landowner was entitled to an implied easement
by prior use, or a quasi-easement, even though the easement was
not strictly necessary to support the land.6' The County of
Hanover, which owned the purported servient tract, argued that
the Carters were not entitled to an implied easement by prior use
because the right of way was not strictly necessary.6' The court
disagreed, holding that the strict necessity test is applicable only
when determining if an implied easement by necessity exists to
support a landlocked tract.62 Instead, the necessity test for im-
plied easements by prior use is a subjective standard somewhere
signed to protect the FDIC (the "D'Oench, Duhme doctrine") because that doctrine only
applies to cases involving conduct that misleads the FDIC. The court concluded that BMC
had not engaged in such conduct. Id. at 82-84, 496 S.E.2d at 69.
54. 258 Va. 163, 515 S.E.2d 577 (1999).
55. Id. at 168, 515 S.E.2d at 580.
56. Id. at 166, 515 S.E.2d at 578.
57. Id. at 167, 515 S.E.2d at 579.
58. Id. at 168-70, 515 S.E.2d at 580-81.
59. 255 Va. 160, 496 S.E.2d 42 (1998).
60. Id. at 169, 496 S.E.2d at 47. An implied easement by prior use arises when three
elements are met: "(1) the dominant and servient tracts originated from a common gran-
tor, (2) the use was in existence at the time of the severance [of the two tracts], and that
(3) the use is apparent, continuous and reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the
dominant tract." Id. at 167, 496 S.E.2d at 46 (internal itations omitted).
61. Id. at 168, 496 S.E.2d at 46.
62. Id. at 168-69, 496 S.E.2d at 46.
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between strict necessity and mere convenience.63 Moreover, the
court explained that the necessity inquiry focuses on whether the
easement is necessary for the severed, not the original, dominant
estate.' Because the dominant tenants demonstrated that the
easement was still reasonably necessary to support farming op-
erations on their land, the easement that existed at severance
continued by implication.65 However, the court limited the scope
of the easement to the use that was made of the right of way at
the time of severance.66
In Prospect Development Co. v. Bershader,67 a majority of the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that a purchaser'q reliance on
various representations made by the seller's agents gave rise to a
negative easement by estoppel.6" The seller was well aware that
the purchasers, the Bershaders, wanted to live near undeveloped
land.69 Although at least one of the seller's agents knew that the
statements were not true, the seller's agents repeatedly repre-
sented that tests conducted by Fairfax County showed that the
lot adjacent to the parcel the Bershaders ultimately purchased
could not be developed.7° These representations induced the Ber-
63. Id. at 169, 496 S.E.2d at 46. In Carter, the party claiming the right to the quasi-
easement was the grantee at severance. Id. at 164, 496 S.E.2d at 44. Although the issue
was not implicated in Carter, some jurisdictions have held that a strict necessity standard
should apply when the grantor or his successor claims to have an implied easement by
prior use. See, e.g., litchell v. Castellaw, 246 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Tex. 1952). This approach
is based on the theory that the grantors failure to create an easement expressly by reser-
vation or exception should not be lightly excused because the grantor has control over the
deed. Id. at 167. Other jurisdictions disagree and, while acknowledging a grantor must
make a stronger showing of necessity than a grantee, apply a flexible subjective standard
similar to the one adopted in Carter to all cases, regardless of the identity of the purported
dominant tenant. See, e.g., Granite Props. Ltd. v. Manns, 512 N.E.2d 1230 (IlM. 1987). In
Granite Properties, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated:
While the degree of necessity required to reserve an easement by implication
in favor of the conveyor is greater than that required in the case of the con-
veyee. . ., even in the case of the conveyor, the implication from necessity will
be aided by a previous use made apparent by to the physical adaptation of
the premises to it.... Thus, when circumstances such as an apparent prior
use of the land support the inference of the parties' intention, the required
extent of the claimed easement's necessity is the only circumstance from
which the inference of intention will be drawn.
Id. at 1238.
64. Carter, 255 Va. at 169, 496 S.E.2d at 47.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 170, 496 S.E.2d at 47.
67. 258 Va. 75, 515 S.E.2d 291 (1999).
68. Id. at 89, 515 S.E.2d at 299.
69. Id. at 80, 515 S.E.2d at 294.
70. Id. at 82, 515 S.E.2d at 295.
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shaders to purchase the lot for a $15,000 premium.71 Four years
later, after the Bershaders had spent almost $185,000 on im-
provements to naturalize their surroundings, the developer began
building a house on the adjacent lot that the Bershaders had been
told could not be developed. 2 The court held that the developer's
misrepresentations created an implied negative easement appur-
tenant that required the developer to preserve the adjacent tract
in its natural state.73 The court specifically rejected the devel-
oper's argument that no easement could exist because no writing,
including the Bershaders' deed, explicitly created such an inter-
est.
7 4
In a vigorous partial dissent, Justice Lacy, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Carrico and Justice Kinser, argued that the Bershaders' rem-
edy should be entirely in contract and tort and not through the
imposition of an implied easement appurtenant.75 Justice Lacy
noted that the representations made to the Bershaders were
based solely on alleged technological assessments that could
change. 76 Therefore, the Bershaders had no more reason to expect
to receive a perpetual right to live next to undeveloped land than
they would have the right to have a particular zoning classifica-
tion maintained.77
There are two problems with the dissenters' analysis. First, the
developer's fraudulent misrepresentations suggested that the de-
veloper would never develop the property because the property
was inherently unsuitable for development. The developer never
suggested that the problem was temporary or correctable. 8 Sec-
ond, if the Bershaders did not receive an appurtenant easement,
their property would be potentially less valuable at resale be-
cause prospective purchasers would have no guarantee that the
adjacent lot would never be developed. As the majority opinion
implicitly recognized, the Bershaders should receive the full bene-
71. Id. at 83, 515 S.E.2d at 295.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 89, 515 S.E.2d at 299.
74. Id. at 90, 515 S.E.2d at 299 (rejecting defendants' Statute of Frauds defense be-
cause "the object of the statute is to prevent frauds").
75. Id. at 94, 515 S.E.2d at 302 (Lacy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Id. at 95-96, 515 S.E.2d at 302-03 (Lacy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
77. Id. (Lacy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. Id. at 80-83, 515 S.E.2d at 294-96 (discussing the representations made to the
Bershaders).
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fit of the representations upon which they relied, both during
their ownership of the property and at resale. 9
B. Contracts and Deeds
1. Construction
In Bershader, the Supreme Court of Virginia unanimously held
that the developer breached its contract with the Bershaders by
attempting to build on the adjacent lot.8° The developer argued
that it did not breach the contract because the agreement did not
promise that the adjacent lot would be left in its natural state."'
The court, however, held that the contract phrase "premium lot"
was ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence showed that the lot was
offered at a premium because it was next to land that would not
be developed.82 Interestingly, the court never addressed whether
the contract was still in force or merged into the deed. Generally,
once a purchaser accepts a deed, the contract is extinguished and
any available remedy is in the deed alone.8" Virginia law, how-
ever, recognizes exceptions for cases that involve fraud or matters
collateral to title issues.' Although the court did not address the
issue, both exceptions apply to the facts of this case. The ease-
ment in dispute did not implicate matters affecting the Ber-
shaders' title, and the court specifically held that the developer
committed actual and constructive fraud.8
In Moorman v. Shin,8" the Fairfax County Circuit Court en-
forced a ten-year and four-month commercial lease notwith-
79. See id. at 89, 515 S.E.2d at 299 (stating that "it would be manifestly unjust" to al-
low the developer to build a house on the lot when the purchasers of the adjacent lot relied
on representations that one could not be built).
80. Id. at 83-85, 515 S.E.2d at 296. The three partial dissenting justices all agreed
with this portion of the majority opinion. Id. at 94, 515 S.E.2d at 302 (Lacy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
8L Id. at 84, 515 S.E.2d at 296 (arguing that the contract did not reference the adja-
cent lot and contained an integration clause).
82. Id.
83. Miller v. Reynolds, 216 Va. 852, 854, 223 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1976); Woodson v.
Smith, 128 Va. 652, 656, 104 S.E. 794, 795 (1920).
84. Sale v. Figg, 164 Va. 402, 410, 180 S.E. 173, 176 (1935) (matters collateral to title
issues); Woodson, 128 Va. at 656, 104 S.E. at 795 (fraud).
85. Bershader, 258 Va. at 85-86, 515 S.E.2d at 296-97.
86. No. 173483, 1999 WL 797197 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 3, 1999) (Fairfax County) (unpub-
lished decision).
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standing Virginia Code section 55-2," which requires a deed or
will to create an estate for a term of more than five years.88 Al-
though the lease agreement was neither a deed nor a will, the
court held that it was enforceable pursuant to section 55-51,9 un-
der which "[any deed, or a part of a deed, which shall fail to take
effect... shall, nevertheless, be as valid and effectual and as
binding upon the parties thereto, so far as the rules of law and
equity will permit...."90 Relying on a previous opinion by the
Fairfax County Circuit Court in McCue v. Hamel Health, Inc., 1
the court held that section 55-51 applies even where the parties
did not intend to create a deed so long as they intended to grant
an estate in land, such as the leasehold in Moorman.92 This deci-
sion essentially eviscerates the five year limitation in section 55-2
in cases where the intent to create a longer lease is clear and ex-
tends section 55-51 beyond its plain meaning to apply to docu-
ments that are not deeds.
2. Reservation of Interest for Third Party/Common Law
"Stranger Rule"
In Shirley v. Shirley,9" the Supreme Court of Virginia reaf-
firmed the common law "stranger rule," which provides that a
grantor cannot reserve an estate for "a stranger to the deed." 4 In
Shirley, the grantor attempted to reserve a life estate in favor of
her daughter.95 Although the daughter conceded that the common
law proscribed reservations in favor of a stranger to the deed, she
urged the court to modify the common law rule to further the
general policy of enforcing the grantor's intent.96 The court re-
fused to follow the trend in most states, which is to allow reserva-
tions for the benefit of third parties.97 The court noted that modi-
87. Id. at *3.
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
89. Moorman, 1999 WL 797191 at *3.
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-51 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
91. 17 Va. Cir. 331 (Cir. Ct. 1989) (Fairfax County).
92. Moorman, 1999 WL 797197 at *2-3.
93. 259 Va. 513, 525 S.E.2d 274 (2000).
94. Id. at 517, 525 S.E.2d at 276. For a thorough discussion of the "stranger rule," see
9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.09(c)(2) (David A. Thomas ed., 1999).
95. Shirley, 259 Va. at 515, 525 S.E.2d at 275.
96. Id. at 516-17, 525 S.E.2d at 275-76.
97. See id. at 520 n.7, 525 S.E.2d at 277 n.7 (listing the jurisdictions that still adhere
to the "stranger rule").
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fication should be done, if at all, by the legislature because judi-
cial modification would upset the policy favoring certainty of ti-
tle.98
3. Execution
In Lim v. Choi,99 the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that
a poorly drafted memorandum did not convey a property inter-
est.' The memorandum provided:
I purchased the above property... with Mr. Soo-Myung Choi as a co-
owner. However, I hereby state that the ownership of the above
property is not a nature of thing for which I assume responsibility in
paying mortgage.
In the event that Mr. Soo-Myung Choi sells or rents the above house
and needs my signature for the release, I will gladly and without
delay respond to the occasion.
I hereby make it clear.., that all rights belong to Mr. Soo-Myung
Choi alone.
10
'
The court reaffirmed that while the writing need not be in any
particular form to constitute a deed,' °2 it must contain operative
words that manifest the intent to transfer an interest.10 3 The
court also noted that Virginia Code section 55-48, °4 which pre-
scribes a particular form for deeds, does not require deeds to in-
clude the word "transfer" to be effective.0 5 The court nevertheless
held that the memorandum was ineffective because it did not in-
clude words of conveyance or those that otherwise manifest an in-
tent to transfer an interest.10 6
98. Id. at 519, 525 S.E.2d at 277.
99. 256 Va. 167, 501 S.E.2d 141 (1998).
100. Id. at 172, 501 S.E.2d at 144.
101. Id. at 169, 501 S.E.2d at 142.
102. Id. at 171, 501 S.E.2d at 143-44 (citing Albert v. Holt, 137 Va. 5, 8, 119 S.E.2d 120,
121 (1923)).
103. Id. (citing Morison v. Am. Ass'n, 110 Va. 91, 92-93, 65 S.E.2d 469,470 (1909)).
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-48 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
105. Lim, 256 Va. at 171-72, 501 S.E.2d at 144.
106. Id. at 172, 501 S.E.2d at 144.
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C. Fraudulent Sales
In the ubiquitous Bershader opinion, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that the developer's repeated misrepresentations
that a lot adjacent to the purchasers' land would never be devel-
oped constituted actual and constructive fraud.10 7 The court re-
jected the developer's argument that the misrepresentations re-
lated to future events or matters of mere opinion.' 8
In Tate v. Colony House Builders Inc.,'°9 the sellers of real es-
tate told the buyers that the house was free from structural de-
fects, constructed in a workmanlike manner, and fit for habita-
tion."' The Supreme Court of Virginia held that these statements
supported an action for constructive fraud because they consti-
tuted statements of fact and not just expressions of opinion."'
The court, however, held that other statements regarding quiet
possession without the need for significant restoration, rebuilding
or repair were not actionable because they concerned future
events."2 Furthermore, statements that the house was worth the
sales price were "mere puffery" and not fraudulent."'
D. Zoning
1. The Dillon Rule
The Dillon Rule limits municipal corporations to the powers
"that are expressly granted, those that are necessarily or fairly
implied from expressly granted powers, and those that are essen-
tial and indispensable."" 4 In three recent cases, the supreme
court considered whether local zoning ordinances were permissi-
ble under the Dillon Rule, upholding two exercises of local
authority and striking down another.
107. Prospect Dev. Co. v. Bershader, 258 Va. 75, 85-86, 515 S.E.2d 291, 296-97 (1999).
108. Id. at 86, 515 S.E.2d at 297.
109. 257 Va. 78, 508 S.E.2d 597 (1999).
110. Id. at 80, 508 S.E.2d at 598.
111. Id. at 83-84, 508 S.E.2d at 600.
112. Id. at 84, 508 S.E.2d at 600.
113. Id.
114. Tabler v. Fairfax County, 221 Va. 200, 202, 269 S.E.2d 358, 359 (1980) (citing Hil-
ton Enter., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 440, 258 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1979); Fairfax
Zoning Bd. v. Cedar Knoll, 217 Va. 740, 743, 232 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1977); Bd. of Supervi-
sors v. Home, 216 Va. 113, 117, 215 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1975)).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia held in City Council of Alexan-
dria v. The Lindsey Trusts..5 that the City of Alexandria did not
violate the Dillon Rule when it required a special use permit for
the enlargement of restaurant premises." 6 Although the City of
Alexandria previously amended its zoning ordinance to require a
special use permit for the operation of restaurants, the subject
property was grandfathered out of the new requirement."7 Later,
the city amended its zoning ordinance to require a special use
permit for any change, enlargement, extension or increase in the
nature of any existing use, even if a permit had not been required
previously." 8 The property owners leased the premises to a dif-
ferent restaurant and modified the property to accommodate the
new lessees." 9 The court held that the city did not violate the
Dillon Rule by determining that it had the authority to require
the owners to acquire a special use permit for an intensification of
an existing use. 20 The court reasoned that thet city necessarily
had the power to regulate non-conforming uses because the city's
charter authorized the termination of such uses.'2 '
Board of Supervisors v. Washington, D.C. SMSA L.P.'22 in-
volved a lease agreement in which the Virginia Department of
Transportation ("VDOT") authorized wireless telecommunications
companies to construct observation and telecommunications tow-
ers on rights of way owned by VDOT in Fairfax County.'23 Fairfax
County sought a declaration that the companies' activities were
subject to the county's zoning authority.'24 The Supreme Court of
Virginia held that Virginia Code section 15.2-2232125 explicitly
gave localities zoning authority over, among other things, the
construction of public utility facilities, including the towers at is-
sue."'26 The court rejected the argument that the Dillon Rule was
violated, noting that the fact that the towers would be built on
115. 258 Va. 424, 520 S.E.2d 181 (1999).
116. Id. at 429, 520 S.E.2d at 183-84.
117. Id. at 426, 520 S.E.2d at 182.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 427, 520 S.E.2d at 182.
120. Id. at 429, 520 S.E.2d at 183.
12L Id. at 428-29, 520 S.E.2d at 183.
122. 258 Va. 558, 522 S.E.2d 876 (1999).
123. Id. at 560-61, 522 S.E.2d at 877-78.
124. Id. at 562, 522 S.E.2d at 878.
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2232 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
126. Washington, D.C. SMSA L.P., 258 Va. at 566, 522 S.E.2d at 881.
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state-owned land was irrelevant under section 15.2-2232.127
By contrast, in Board of Supervisors v. Countryside Investment
Co.,128 the court held that provisions of the Augusta County Sub-
division Ordinance which asserted authority to specify the sizes
and shapes of lots and to prohibit subdivisions that did not main-
tain a rural environment violated the Dillon Rule. 129 The court
held that neither section 15.2-2241, which prescribes the manda-
tory provisions that must be included in a subdivision ordi-
nance, 130 nor section 15.2-2242, which prescribes optional provi-
sions that may be included in a subdivision ordinance,' 3 '
authorized the provisions adopted by Augusta County.
13 2
2. Vested Rights
In Board of Zoning Appeals v. CaseLin Systems Inc.,33 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia further clarified its decisions concerning
when a property owner acquires a vested right in a land use clas-
sification. The property owner in CaseLin proposed a plan to the
Bland County Board of Supervisors to build a medical waste in-
cinerator on property zoned for agricultural use. 34 CaseLin re-
ceived extensive support from the Board, including letters, certifi-
cation to state officials that the facility would comply with all
local ordinances, and a deed from the County which expressly and
"irrevocably" acknowledged and confirmed CaseLin's right to use
the land as a medical waste incinerator facility.135 Armed with
these assurances, CaseLin incurred significant expenses while
beginning construction.' 36 However, when public opposition to the
project subsequently arose, the Board rescinded its support.13
The supreme court had to interpret its previous opinion in
127. Id. at 564-65, 522 S.E.2d at 880.
128. 258 Va. 497, 522 S.E.2d 610 (1999).
129. Id. at 504-05, 522 S.E.2d at 613-14.
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 15. -2241 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
131. Id. § 15.2-2242 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
132. Countryside Inv. Co., 258 Va. at 504, 522 S.E.2d at 613.
133. 256 Va. 206, 501 S.E.2d 397 (1998).
134. Id. at 208, 501 S.E.2d at 399.
135. Id. at 208-09, 501 S.E.2d at 399.
136. Id. at 209, 501 S.E.2d at 399.
137. Id.
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Snow v. Board of Zoning Appeals,3 ' which held that a landowner
who claims a vested right in a land use classification must,
among other things, "identify a significant official governmental
act that is manifested by the issuance of a permit or other ap-
proval authorizing the landowner to conduct a use on his property
that otherwise would not have been allowed."" 9 In CaseLin, the
court held that "other approval" refers to an act of the same char-
acter and formality as a permit.'4 ° The prior actions of the Board
were not as formal as a permit but rather "were simply state-
ments of the Board's general support of the plan, not a specific
authorization of the project."'4 ' Thus, CaseLin had no vested right
to construct and operate the incinerator.
3. Variances
In Tolman v. Board of Zoning Appeals,' a commercial prop-
erty owner that, after a fire, attempted to rebuild a three-story
apartment building in a residential area zoned for single and
double family homes encountered opposition from neighbors.'
Before the fire, the apartment building was authorized to include
three apartments as a lawful nonconforming use but had, in fact,
included seven apartments. 45 To complete reconstruction, the
owner obtained a variance that allowed the owner to continue to
have seven apartments. 46 The Richmond Circuit Court rejected
the neighbors' challenge, noting that the variance allowed only an
increase in the number of dwellings and not a change in use.'47
4. Cash Proffers
In Gregory v. Board of Supervisors,' the Supreme Court of
138. 248 Va. 404, 448 S.E.2d 606 (1994).
139. Id. at 407, 448 S.E.2d at 608.
140. CaseLin, 256 Va. at 212, 501 S.E.2d at 401.
14L Id.
142. See id. at 213, 501 S.E.2d at 402.
143. 46 Va. Cir. 359 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Richmond City).
144. Id. at 360.
145. Id. at 359-60.
146. Id. at 360.
147. Id. at 361.
148. 257 Va. 530, 514 S.E.2d 350 (1999).
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Virginia rejected a challenge to a denial of an application for re-
zoning where the applicant submitted cash proffers that were
substantially lower than those recommended by Chesterfield
County. 149 In a previous decision, the court upheld a similar
challenge in which the denial was based solely on the failure to
make requested cash proffers. 5 In Gregory, the court rejected the
challenge because Chesterfield County showed that its denial of
the application was based on health, safety and welfare concerns,
and not on the amount of the proffers.' 5'
E. Exercise of Eminent Domain Power by Public Utility
In VYVX, Inc. v. Cassell,'52 a public utility attempted to exer-
cise eminent domain to acquire easements.'53 The State Corpora-
tion Commission ("SCC") ordered VYVX to cease all eminent do-
main activity until it obtained a certificate of public convenience
and necessity.'54 The SCC subsequently denied the application
and imposed a fine.'55 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that Virginia Code section 56-35,' which generally empow-
ers the SCC to supervise, regulate and control public service utili-
ties, authorized the SCC to determine whether VYVX was prop-
erly exercising eminent domain power. 57 The court also held that
VYVX's exercise of the power of eminent domain violated Virginia
Code section 56-49(2),' which requires a public service corpora-
tion that has not been allotted territory by the SCC to obtain all
required certificates of public convenience and necessity before it
exercises eminent domain power for electric lines, facilities,
works or purposes. 5 9 The court rejected VYVX's reliance on Peck
149. Id. at 539, 514 S.E.2d at 355.
150. Bd. of Supervisors v. Reed's Landing Corp., 250 Va. 397, 400, 463 S.E.2d 668, 670
(1995) (holding that "the proffer constituted a condition precedent and was not voluntary
within the meaning of the statute").
151. Gregory, 257 Va. at 537-38, 514 S.E.2d at 354.
152. 258 Va. 276, 519 S.E.2d 124 (1999).
153. Id. at 284-85, 519 S.E.2d at 126-27.
154. Id. at 284-85, 519 S.E.2d at 127-28.
155. Id. at 285-86, 519 S.E.2d at 127-28.
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-35 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
157. Cassell, 258 Va. at 290-91, 519 S.E.2d at 131.
158. Id. at 292, 519 S.E.2d at 131-32.
159. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-49(2) (Cum. Supp. 2000). For a description of a recent
amendment to this code provision, see infra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
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Iron & Metal Co. v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 6' which held that a
public service corporation need not obtain a certificate of public
convenience and necessity before exercising eminent domain.'6 '
The supreme court distinguished Peck Iron on the grounds that
VYVX was a public utility, not a public service corporation, and
thus was subject to Virginia Code section 56-265.2.62
F. Leaseholds
1. Liabilities of Assignees
In Pollard & Bagby, Inc. v. Pierce Arrow, L.L.C.,6 3 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia considered whether a landlord's assignee
assumed the responsibility for paying commissions to a leasing
agent.' The assignee paid commissions through the end of ex-
isting lease terms but refused to pay further commissions after it
renewed leases with tenants whom the agent had procured for
the prior owner.161 The new owner argued that it was liable only
for obligations it expressly assumed in its purchase agreement.
66
The court rejected this argument and held that the assignee
stepped into the prior owner's shoes and was bound by the con-
tract between the original owner and the agent. 67
2. Landlord's Common Law Duty to Maintain Premises
In Wohlford v. Quesenberry,68 the Supreme Court of Virginia
160. 206 Va. 711, 146 S.E.2d 169 (1966).
161. Id. at 717-18, 146 S.E.2d at 173.
162. Cassell, 258 Va. at 293, 519 S.E.2d at 132. Virginia Code section 56-265.2 states:
It shall be unlawful for any public utility to construct, enlarge or acquire, by
lease or otherwise, any facilities for use in public utility service, except ordi-
nary extensions or improvements in the usual course of business, without
first having obtained a certificate from the Commission that the public con-
venience and necessity require the exercise of such right or privilege. Any
certificate required by this section shall be issued by the Commission only af-
ter opportunity for a hearing and after due notice to interested parties.
VA. CODE ANN. § 56-265.2 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
163. 258 Va. 524, 521 S.E.2d 761 (1999).
164. Id. at 526, 521 S.E.2d at 761.
165. Id. at 526, 521 S.E.2d at 762.
166. Id. at 527, 521 S.E.2d at 762.
167. Id. at 529, 521 S.E.2d at 763-64.
168. 259 Va. 259, 523 S.E.2d 821 (2000).
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held that the Uniform Statewide Building Code ("BOCA")69 did
not modify the common law rule that a tenant who has exclusive
possession and control of a premises is responsible for mainte-
nance and repair. 170 The court held that the term "owner" in
BOCA included a tenant who controlled the leased premises.' 7'
Because the tenant was obligated to maintain and repair the
premises, the landlord was not liable for the tenant's damaged
personal property or personal injuries caused by alleged defects
in the premises. 72
3. Virginia Fair Housing Law/ Sexual Harrassment
In Allen v. Seventy-Seven Acres,"3 a case of first impression,
the Rockingham County Circuit Court held that a landlord's sex-
ual harassment of a tenant violated section 36-96.3 of the Vir-
ginia Fair Housing Law. 74 The managing partner of the complex
requested sexual favors in exchange for favorable lease terms.' 5
The circuit court held that sexual quid pro quo requests consti-
tute sexual discrimination.'76 Although the Fair Housing Law
does not expressly refer to such behavior, the circuit court broadly
construed the Act's policy and the phrase "sexual discrimina-
169. VA. CODE ANN. § 36.97 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
170. Wohiford, 259 Va. at 262, 523 S.E.2d at 822; see also Willis v. Wrenn's Ex'x, 141
Va. 385, 389, 127 S.E. 312, 313 (1925). In Willis, the court held:
It is the well-settled common-law rule that a tenant's general covenant to re-
pair the demised premises binds him under all circumstances, even though
the injury proceeds from an act of God, from the elements, or from the act of a
stranger, and, if he desires to relieve himself from liability for injuries re-
sulting from any of the causes above enumerated, or from any other cause
whatever, he must take care to except them from the operations of his cove-
nant.
Willis, 141 Va. at 389, 127 S.E. at 313 (quoting 16 R.C.L § 605, at 1088 (1929)).
171. Wohlford, 259 Va. at 262, 523 S.E.2d at 822. Virginia Code section 36-97 provides:
"As used in this chapter, unless the context or subject matter requires otherwise, the fol-
lowing words or terms shall have the meaning herein ascribed to them, respectively:...
'Owner' means... lessee in control of a building or structure." VA. CODE ANN. § 36-97
(Cum. Supp. 2000).
172. Wohlford, 259 Va. at 262, 523 S.E.2d at 822.
173. 48 Va. Cir. 318 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Rockingham County).
174. Id. at 325. Section 36-96.3 of the Virginia Fair Housing Law makes it an unlawful
discriminatory housing practice to represent that housing is unavailable to purchase, rent,
or inspect because of sex. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.3 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
175. Seventy-Seven Acres, 48 Va. Cir. at 318.
176. Id. at 325.
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tion."77 The court was not persuaded by a decision of the
Martinsville City Circuit Court which held that sexual harass-
ment does not constitute sexual discrimination under Virginia
employment law.178
4. Tenant Right of Action Under the VRLTA
In Thompson v. Springer Manor Apartments,"9 the Richmond
City Circuit Court held that the Virginia Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act'e" provides tenants a private right of action for
any breach by a landlord of any duty imposed by the Act.' 8 The
court based its decision on Virginia Code section 8.01-221, which
provides that "[a]ny person injured by the violation of any statute
may recover from the offender such damages as he may sustain
by reason of the violation .... "182
5. Landlord's Recovery of Fees and Costs
In Plantation House, L.P. v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc.,'83 the
Richmond City Circuit Court held that a landlord was entitled,
pursuant to a cost of collection provision in a commercial lease, to
recover attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against a
counterclaim for breach of contract and constructive eviction."
The court held that the provision entitled the landlord to recover
because the landlord's defense of the counterclaim was necessary
to prevail on his primary claim for rent.
18 5
G. Premises Liability
In Amos v. NationsBank,'86 the plaintiff, while on the bank's
177. Id. at 324.
178. Stallings v. Leeds, Inc., 37 Va. Cir. 469 (Cir. Ct. 1996) (Martinsville City).
179. 46 Va. Cir. 408 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Richmond City).
180. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.2 to -.40 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
181. Thompson, 46 Va. Cir. at 408.
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-221 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
183. 45 Va. Cir. 556 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Richmond City).
184. Id. at 557-58.
185. Id. at 558.
186. 256 Va. 344, 504 S.E.2d 365 (1998).
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premises, slipped on ice from an ongoing ice storm.'87 The su-
preme court held that, although the bank had a duty to exercise
ordinary care to maintain safe premises, it was not liable because
it had no duty to remove the ice until the storm ceased and a rea-
sonable time passed.'
In Wood v. Woolfolk Properties, Inc.,189 the plaintiff tripped over
a curb while visiting a steak house in a shopping center.' 90 The
CEO of the property management firm had previously recom-
mended that the same curb be painted white for safety reasons.' 9'
The defendants persuaded the trial court to allow rebuttal testi-
mony that there were no prior accidents at the curb.' 92 On appeal,
the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in admitting the
testimony.'93 The defendants argued that this rebuttal evidence
was admissible under Sykes v. Norfolk and Western Railway
Co. '9 In Sykes, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that evidence
pertaining to prior accidents at a railway crossing was admissible
to rebut the inference that the railway company's failure to in-
stall recommended safety devices at the crossing constituted neg-
ligence.'95 Employing reasoning that is somewhat difficult to fol-
low, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the Sykes exception
was inapplicable and that the evidence of no prior accidents at
the site was improperly admitted.' 9 The court distinguished
Sykes by suggesting that the testimony in Wood was relevant
only to the issue of notice of the unsafe condition and not to rebut
the inference of negligence. 197 Justice Compton, dissenting from
this portion of the opinion, argued that Sykes controlled.'98
In Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. Dungee,'99 the Supreme
Court of Virginia upheld a $20,000,000 jury award against Vir-
ginia Power in favor of a ten-year-old child who was severely
187. Id. at 346, 504 S.E.2d at 366.
188. Id. at 349, 504 S.E.2d at 368.
189. 258 Va. 133, 515 S.E.2d 304 (1999).
190. Id. at 135, 515 S.E.2d at 305.
191. Id. at 135-36, 515 S.E.2d at 305.
192. Id. at 136, 515 S.E.2d at 305.
193. Id. at 136, 515 S.E.2d at 305-06.
194. 200 Va. 559, 106 S.E.2d 746 (1959).
195. Id. at 565, 106 S.E.2d at 751.
196. Wood, 258 Va. at 139, 515 S.E.2d at 307.
197. Id. at 138, 515 S.E.2d at 307.
198. Id. at 139, 515 S.E.2d at 307 (Compton, J., dissenting in part).
199. 258 Va. 235, 520 S.E.2d 164 (1999).
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burned while trespassing on Virginia Power's electric substa-
tion.2°" The court upheld the trial court's jury instruction that
Virginia Power "was required to 'use a high degree of care com-
mensurate with the danger involved to prevent injury to oth-
ers.' 20 1 The court followed its previous decision in Daugherty v.
Hippchen, °2 which held that the owner of a dangerous instru-
mentality who knows or should know that children might play in
the area of the instrumentality has a duty to use a high degree of
care to protect even trespassing children.0 3
H. Nuisance
In Breeding v. Hensley, °4 the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that Virginia Code section 8.01-222, o5 which requires a plaintiff
bringing a negligence action against a municipality to give writ-
ten notice of the claim within six months after the cause of action
accrues, applied to a public nuisance action.2 6 Although nuisance
and negligence are distinct concepts, the court held that the no-
tice provision in Virginia Code section 8.01-222 applied because
negligence is an essential element of a nuisance action.20 7
I. Mechanics'Liens
In Carolina Builders Corp. v. Cenit Equity Co.,2°8 the Supreme
Court of Virginia invalidated a mechanic's lien because some of
the materials listed in the lien memorandum were furnished be-
yond the 150-day "look back" period provided by Virginia Code
section 43-4.29 The builder, Carolina Builders, filed a memoran-
dum of mechanic's lien against real estate in York County for the
amount owed for materials that Carolina provided for the con-
200. Id. at 241-42, 520 S.E.2d at 168-69.
20L Id. at 256-57, 520 S.E.2d at 176.
202. 175 Va. 62, 7 S.E.2d 119 (1940).
203. Dungee, 258 Va. at 256, 520 S.E.2d at 176.
204. 258 Va. 207, 519 S.E.2d 369 (1999).
205. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-222 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
206. Breeding, 258 Va. at 214-15, 519 S.E.2d at 372-73.
207. Id. at 215, 519 S.E.2d at 373.
208. 257 Va. 405, 512 S.E.2d 550 (1999).
209. Id. at 409-10, 512 S.E.2d at 552-53; VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
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struction of a house on the property.21 ° Although the memoran-
dum indicated that the lien covered amounts within a 150-day
period, Carolina continued to provide material for longer than
150 days.21' The court held that Virginia Code section 43-4 clearly
provides that no lien can secure any amount owed beyond 150
days from the last day that materials were furnished, rather than
from the last date listed on the lien.212 The court further held that
the entire lien was unenforceable because the 150-day limitation
is a prerequisite to perfection of the lien.21 s
In Davenport Insulation, Inc., v. Aliff,214 the Harrisonburg City
Circuit Court, relying in part on Carolina Builders, held that Vir-
ginia Code section 43-4 requires that the lien memorandum prop-
erly record the names of the parties as a prerequisite to perfec-
tion.215  Because the memorandum referred to a Virginia
corporation that was not the party in interest, the plaintiff's lien
was unperfected.216
In York Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. William A. Hazel,
Inc. ,217 a subcontractor suing to enforce a mechanic's lien that was
bonded off pursuant to Virginia Code section 43-702"8 argued that
it had no duty to prove the relative priority of the lien because the
holders of the deed of trust stipulated to the lien's enforceabil-
ity.219 Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court of Virginia
noted that the holder of the deed of trust did not stipulate to the
subcontractor's right to collect from the real estate and that the
210. Carolina Builders Corp., 257 Va. at 407-08, 512 S.E.2d at 550-51.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 409-10, 512 S.E.2d at 552.
213. Id. at 411, 512 S.E.2d at 553.
214. No. 16918, 1999 WL 1114672 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 12, 1999) (Harrisonburg City).
215. Id. at *2.
216. Id. at *3.
217. 256 Va. 598, 506 S.E.2d 315 (1998).
218. VA. CODE ANN. § 43.70 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
219. York Fed. Say., 256 Va. at 599-600, 506 S.E.2d at 316. Virginia Code section 43-70
provides:
In any suit brought [to enforce a mechanic's lien], the owner of the building
and premises to which the lien, or liens, sought to be enforced shall have at-
tached, the general contractor for such building or other parties in interest
may ... apply to the court in which such suit shall be pending ... for permis-
sion to... file a bond... conditioned for the payment of such judgment adju-
dicating the lien or liens to be valid and determining the amount for which
the same would have been enforceable against the real estate as may be ren-
dered by the court upon the hearing of the case on its merits ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 43-70 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
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holder consistently took the position that the subcontractor's re-
covery was precluded by the priority of the holder's lien.2 °
J. Real Estate Taxes
In City of Richmond v. Virginia United Methodist Homes
Inc.,221 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a group home for
the aging had to pay real estate taxes because it did not qualify
for Virginia Code section 58.1-3606(A)(5)'s 222 exemption for asy-
lums.2" The Virginia Constitution requires that tax exemptions
be strictly construed.2 ' Although the home was once tax-exempt,
the court held that it no longer qualified as an asylum because it
only generally catered to the aged and not specifically to the in-
firm or destitute.
In Tidewater Psychiatric Institute, Inc. v. City of Virginia
Beach,226 the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected a challenge to
the City of Virginia Beach's use of the depreciated reproduction
cost method in assessing real estate taxes.2  The court held that
the city's use of this method was presumptively valid because the
city had properly considered and rejected other methods of cal-
culation.2 By contrast, the Fairfax County Circuit Court recently
upheld a challenge to the use of this same method where the tax-
payer showed that the County ignored other more taxpayer-
friendly, viable assessment methods.229
K. Condominiums/Utility Taxes
In Board of Directors of the Tuckahoe Ass'n, Inc. v. City of
220. York Fed. Say., 256 Va. at 601-02, 506 S.E.2d at 317.
221. 257 Va. 146, 509 S.E.2d 504(1999).
222. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3606(A)(5) (Repl. Vol. 1997). Section 58.1-3606(A)(5) pro-
vides an exemption for "[p]roperty belonging to and actually and exclusively occupied and
used by the Young Men's Christian Associations and similar religious associations, in-
cluding religious mission boards and associations, orphan or other asylums, reformatories,
hospitals and nunneries, conducted not for profit but exclusively as charities." Id.
223. Va. United Methodist Homes, Inc., 257 Va. at 159, 509 S.E.2d at 509-10.
224. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6(f).
225. Va. United Methodist Homes Inc., 257 Va. at 158-59, 509 S.E.2d at 509.
226. 256 Va. 136, 501 S.E.2d 761 (1998).
227. Id. at 142-43, 501 S.E.2d at 765.
228. Id. at 142, 501 S.E.2d at 764-65.
229. HCA Health Servs. of Va., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 157943, 1999 WL 795664
(Va. Cir. Ct. June 29, 1999) (Fairfax County) (unpublished decision).
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Richmond,2 3' a condominium association purchased electricity
and natural gas at commercial rates and distributed the services
to individual condominium owners.23' When the City of Richmond
imposed higher tax rates on commercial utility users, the associa-
tion argued that it should only be required to pay the residential
rate because the utilities were distributed to individual condo-
minium owners.123 The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the
city's tax classifications because the association was not a "'resi-
dential customer' of the utility providers" since "it d[id] not pur-
chase residential service from those providers" and because the
classifications were not unreasonable or arbitrary.233
III. LEGISLATION 234
A. Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
1. General Provisions
In 2000, the Virginia General Assembly enacted numerous re-
visions to the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
("VRLTA). 235 The amendments range from relatively minor word
changes to fairly extensive restructuring of existing provisions.
For example, the General Assembly changed "lease" to "rental
agreement" and "apartment" to "dwelling unit."236 The General
Assembly also relocated provisions governing security deposits,
notice of pesticide use, abuse of access, and conditions for relief,
orders and proceedings of court regarding a tenant's assertions of
a landlord's noncompliance with a lease or the law.237
The General Assembly also enacted several important substan-
tive amendments. The VRLTA now proscribes unilateral changes
by either party to a rental agreement without notice and written
230. 257 Va. 110, 510 S.E.2d 238 (1999).
231. Id. at 113, 510 S.E.2d at 239.
232. Id. at 114, 510 S.E.2d at 239-40.
233. Id. at 117, 510 S.E.2d at 242-43.
234. To view summaries of all legislative changes to Virginia property law, see Legisla-
tive Information System at http://legl.state.va.us (last visited July 26, 2000).
235. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.2 to .40 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
236. Id.
237. Id.
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consent.238 Landlords must, with limited exceptions, maintain the
confidentiality of all, not just financial, records regarding the ten-
ant that are not explicitly subject to disclosure. 9 Under Virginia
Code section 55-248.17, any regulation the landlord changes or
provides to the tenant after the tenant enters into the rental
agreement is enforceable provided reasonable notice is given and
the provision either does not substantially modify the agreement
or the tenant consents to it." ° Finally, the security deposit provi-
sion, which was moved from Virginia Code section 55-248.11 to
section 55-248.15:1, provides that if damage to the premises ex-
ceeds the amount of the security deposit and requires the work of
a third party, the landlord must give the tenant notice of that fact
within thirty days."4 If such notice is given, the landlord has an
additional fifteen days to itemize the damages and costs of re-
242pair.
2. Barring Disruptive Guests or Invitees
In 1999, the Assembly amended Virginia Code section 55-248.4
to define "guest or invitee of a tenant" as "a person, other than
the tenant or person authorized by the landlord to occupy the
premises, who has the permission of the tenant to visit but not
occupy the premises."' Virginia Code section 55-248.31:01
authorizes a landlord to bar guests and invitees from the prem-
ises by delivering a written notice to the invitee or guest if that
person's conduct violates a term of the lease, a local ordinance, or
a state or federal law.' The notice must describe the conduct
that prompts the landlord to act." 5 If the landlord has personally
served notice, he may also apply to a magistrate to obtain a war-
rant for trespass. 6 "The tenant may file a tenant's assertion...
requesting that the general district court review the landlord's
action to bar the guest or invitee." 47
238. Id. § 55-248.7(G) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
239. Id. § 55-248.9:1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
240. Id. § 55-248.17(B) (Cum. Supp. 2000). This provision, formerly subsection (b), pre-
viously applied only to regulations that were adopted by the landlord after the tenant
signed the rental agreement.
24L Id. §§ 55-248.11, -248.15:1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
242. Id. § 55-248.15:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
243. Id. § 55-248.4 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
244 Id. § 55-248.31:01(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
245. Id.
246. Id. § 55-248.31:01(B) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
247. Id. § 55-248.31:01(C) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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3. Unlawful Detainer Actions
In 2000, the General Assembly amended the statute that gov-
erns summons for unlawful detainer.' In all unlawful detainer
actions, the time for serving the summons has been increased
from five to ten days before the return date. 9 If the summons is
filed pursuant to the VRLTA to terminate a tenancy, the initial
hearing must occur within twenty-one calendar days of the filing,
subject to only two exceptions. ° If a judge is not available to hold
court, the hearing must take place "as soon as practicable."25' If
the plaintiff requests that the hearing take place later, then the
hearing must be set on a date that is available for both the plain-
tiff and the court.2
In 1999, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
55-248.25:1 to provide that a court shall, upon a landlord's re-
quest, require a tenant who seeks a continuance or to set a con-
tested trial date in an unlawful detainer action to pay into a court
escrow account the rent due as of the continuance or contested
trial date.253 The court, however, does not have to require the rent
to be escrowed if the tenant has pled a good faith defense or if the
landlord requests a continuance or contested trial. 4 The court
has the discretion to grant the tenant an additional week to pay
the rent into the court escrow account.255 If the tenant fails to
make required payments into the court escrow account, the court
shall, upon the landlord's request, enter judgment for the land-
lord, including an order of possession. 6 Also, upon the landlord's
motion, "the court may disburse [the escrow funds] to the land-
lord for payment of the mortgage or other expenses related to the
dwelling unit."25
248. Id. § 8.01-126 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. § 55-248.25:1(A), (B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
254. Id. § 55-248.25:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
255. Id. § 55-248.25:1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
256. Id. § 55-248.25:1(B), (C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
257. Id. § 55-248.25:1(D) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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B. Virginia Fair Housing Law
In 2000, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
36-96.7 of the Virginia Fair Housing Law258 to conform to the fed-
eral Fair Housing Law provision governing housing for older per-
sons. 2 9 The General Assembly repealed the requirement that, to
qualify as housing for older persons, the property must have sig-
nificant facilities and services specifically designed for older per-
sons or provide important housing opportunities for older per-
sons.26" The General Assembly also reduced the occupied unit
requirement from eighty percent of all units being occupied by
persons fifty-five years or older to eighty percent of all occupied
units being occupied by persons of that age group.
2 6 1
C. Liability for Lead Poisoning in a Residential Dwelling
During its 2000 session, the General Assembly enacted a new
law that, under certain circumstances, provides immunity to
owners and selling, leasing, or maintenance agents from civil li-
ability for lead poisoning in a residential dwelling.2 The owner
or agent must comply with the federal Lead-based Paint Poison-
ing Prevention Act 263 and, before the signing of the contract or
lease, provide the purchaser or lessee with specified literature
and notice of any known lead hazardsY.2 The purchaser or tenant
must acknowledge receipt of this information in writing. 5 If the
agent is a public housing authority, it must also comply with all
applicable federal laws and regulations.266 Additionally, to avoid
liability for lead-based paint hazards, an owner or maintenance
agent must maintain the property in a fit and habitable condition
and in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. 7
258. Id. § 36-96.7 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b) (1994).
260. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.7(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
261. Id. § 36-96.7(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
262. Id. § 8.01-226.7 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
263. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4821-4846 (1994).
264. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-226.7 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
265. Id.
266. Id. § 8.01-226.7(B)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
267. Id. § 8.01-226.7(C)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
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D. Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
In 2000, the General Assembly enacted a statutory rule against
perpetuities that is uniform with the rule adopted in most other
states.268 While retaining the rule requiring a property interest to
vest within twenty-one years of a life in being, the law now also
provides that any interest that might fail under the existing rule
has ninety years to vest.269 If the interest does not vest after
ninety years, a court may reform it to create a valid interest that
implements the transferor's original intent.'
E. Condominium Act
In 1999, the General Assembly adopted several amendments to
the Condominium Act .2 " An individual unit owner who desires to
sell a condominium unit must disclose in the sales contract that:
(i) the unit is located in a development which is subject to the Con-
dominium Act; (ii) the Act requires the seller to obtain from the unit
owners' association a resale certificate and provide it to the pur-
chaser; (iii) the purchaser may cancel the contract within three days
after receiving the resale certificate; and (iv) the right to receive the
resale certificate and the right to cancel the contract are waived con-
clusively if not exercised before settlement.
272
If the seller does not disclose these items, the prospective pur-
chaser's exclusive remedy is to cancel the contract before settle-
ment.2 11 Virginia Code section 55-79.97 further provides:
The information contained in the resale certificate shall be current
as of a specified date within thirty days of the date of the contract.
The purchaser may cancel the contract (i) within three days after the
date of the contract, if the purchaser receives the resale certificate on
or before the date that the prospective purchaser signs the contract;
(ii) within three days after receiving the resale certificate if the re-
sale certificate is hand delivered; or (iii) within six days after the
postmark date if the resale certificate is sent to the purchaser by
United States mail. Notice of cancellation must be hand-delivered or
268. Id. §§ 55-12.1 to -12.6 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
269. Id. § 55-12.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
270. Id. § 55-12.3 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
271. Id. § 55-79.97 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
272. Id. § 55-79.97(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
273. Id. § 55-79.97(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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sent by United States mail, return receipt requested, to the unit
owner selling the unit. Such a cancellation shall be without penalty,
and the unit owner shall cause any deposit to be returned promptly
to the purchaser.
274
F. Eminent Domain
1. General Provisions
During its 2000 session, the General Assembly enacted two
laws that affect all exercises of eminent domain power. The first
involves fairly detailed amendments to the general eminent do-
main provisions of the Code.2 75 The condemnor must conduct a ti-
tle search before making a purchase offer or filing a certificate to
take and must provide a copy of its appraisal with the offer of
purchase. 7 Property owners may elect to have either a panel of
commissioners or a jury determine the amount of just compensa-
tion.277 If the owner does not make this election, the petitioner
may do soY The General Assembly increased the limit on com-
pensation for a survey that the condemnee conducted from $100
to $1,000.7' Finally, any tenant for a term of twelve months or
longer may intervene in an eminent domain proceeding that af-
fects the leased premises."0
The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisi-
tions Policies Act of 1972 now applies to all condemnation acts of
state agencies that cause displacement."s The Assembly removed
274. Id. § 55-79.97(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
275. Id. § 25-46.5 (Repl. Vol. 2000). For a comprehensive review of all changes see Leg-
islative Information System at httpJlfiegl.state.va.us (last visited July 26, 2000).
276. VA. CoDE ANN. § 25-46.5(B), (C) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
277. Id. § 25-46.5 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
278. Id. § 25-46.9 (Repl. Vol. 2000). The extensive provisions regarding proceedings by
jury can be found in Virginia Code section 25-46.20(B). Id. § 25-46.20(B) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
279. Id. § 25-46.32 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
280. Id. § 25-46.21:1 (Repl. VoL 2000).
281. Id. § 25-236 (Repl. Vol. 2000). The statute applies to acts of condemnation commit-
ted by a state agency, which is defined as any
(i) department, agency or instrumentality of the Commonwealth; (ii) public
authority, municipal corporation, local governmental unit or political subdivi-
sion of the Commonwealth or any department, agency or instrumentality
thereof, (iii) person who has the authority to acquire property by eminent
domain under state law; or (iv) two or more of the aforementioned, which car-
ries out projects that cause people to be displaced.
Id § 25-238(4) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
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the former restriction that limited the Act's application to projects
or programs in which federal or state funds are used.282 The As-
sembly added a new provision that eliminates the requirement
for an appraisal if, based on assessment records or other objective
evidence, the property is valued at less than $10,000.283
2. Transportation Commissioner
Virginia Code section 33.1-89 provides eminent domain power
to the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner to acquire
interests in municipal property for specific purposes.2" Under the
previous version of the law, whenever the Commissioner acquired
property at the request of a municipality, the Commissioner could
convey title to the municipality only according to the terms of any
agreement between the Commonwealth and the municipality. In
1999, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 33.1-
89 to require that the Commissioner convey title to the munici-
pality in these cases, subject to limited exceptions.285
In 2000, the General Assembly also added a new provision that
requires the Transportation Commissioner to notify the owner of
a building, structure or improvement if the Commissioner intends
to condemn the property in a manner resulting in a taking. 6 The
law permits the owner to present evidence of fair market value in
the valuation proceeding.2"7 The Transportation Commissioner
also may not exercise eminent domain power to acquire any por-
tion of an existing commercial establishment if the acquisition is
done to control or limit access to such establishments within 300
feet of an interstate highway.288 Under this same law, interstate
exchanges are designated "urban" if the value of the land, build-
ings and improvements has a fair market value of at least one
million dollars.28 9
282. Id. § 25-236(A) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
283. Id. § 25-248 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
284. Id. § 33.1-89 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
285. Id. (Cum. Supp. 1999).
286. Id. § 33.1-95.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
287. Id. § 33.1-95.1(2) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
288. S.B. 110, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 4, 2000, ch.
370, 2000 Va. Acts 517) (to be codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-1-49). This law goes into
effect on July 1, 2001 unless the federal government notifies the Department of Transpor-
tation that the law will reduce or jeopardize federal funding. Id.
289. Id.
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3. Public Corporations
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 56-49 to
clarify that a public corporation that has not received a certificate
to provide utility service may not exercise eminent domain power
until it has obtained a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity.29° Virginia Code section 56-49 previously imposed this re-
quirement only on public service corporations to which the State
Corporation Commission had not allotted territory for public
291utility service.
G. Zoning
In 1999, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
15.2-2288.1 to prohibit municipalities from requiring residential
developers to obtain, "as a condition of approval of a subdivision
plat, site plan, or plan of development, or issuance of a building
permit," a special exception, special use or conditional use permit
at the use, height and density permitted by right under the local
zoning ordinance.292 The statute provides exceptions for a cluster
or town center, areas designated for steep slope mountain devel-
opment, utility facilities, and numerous nonresidential uses.293
H. Real Estate Taxes
In 1999, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-3916 to replace section 58.1-3991.294 Under Virginia Code
section 58.1-3991, a locality had discretion to determine the rate
of interest to be paid on refunds of erroneously assessed taxes.295
Section 58.1-3916 now requires a locality to pay the same interest
on erroneously assessed taxes that it charges for delinquent tax
payments, even if the locality has not conformed its ordinance to
this new standard.296
290. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-49 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
29L Id. § 56-49 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
292. Id. § 15.2-2288.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
293. Id.
294. Id. § 58.1-3991 (Repl. Vol. 1997); id. § 58.1-3916 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
295. Id. § 58.1-3991 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
296. Id. § 58.1-3916 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
20001 1015
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:981
Taxpayers no longer need to petition a circuit court to obtain a
correction of an erroneous assessment of real estate tax caused by
a factual error. As amended, Virginia Code sections 58.1-3980
and 58.1-3981 require the Commissioner of Revenue, either on
his own initiative or upon petition by a taxpayer, to correct an er-
roneous assessment that the Commissioner finds was caused by a
factual error made by a municipal employee who was working on
general reassessments. 297
In 1999, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-3965 to provide that certain property with an assessed value
of $20,000 or less may be deemed abandoned and sold to pay de-
linquent taxes.298 Such property can be deemed abandoned and
sold on December 31 following the seventh anniversary of the due
date of the taxes.2 99 Alternatively, property at this value can be
deemed abandoned and sold on December 31 following the third
anniversary of the due date if the property is a declared, un-
abated nuisance and is subject to an unpaid lien for the cost of
abatement."°° Cities have been given even more flexibility in
dealing with delinquent taxpayers. Cities may adopt ordinances
to sell real estate, with proper notice, when taxes on that prop-
erty are delinquent on December 31 following the first anniver-
sary of the due date of the taxes.30 ' The General Assembly also
authorized localities to adopt ordinances releasing liens for delin-
quent taxes, provided the purchaser is not related to and has no
business association with the owner, the purchaser owes no de-
linquent real estate taxes, and the property is valued at less than
$50,000.302
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 58.1-
3231 to allow localities to provide a special assessment and tax
rate on a sliding scale for property held for longer time periods
within the classes of real estate established in section 58.1-3230,
which includes property for agricultural, horticultural, forest, and
open-space uses.03 If a locality provides such a sliding scale, Vir-
ginia Code section 58.1-3234(3) requires the property owner and
297. Id. § 58.1-3980 to -3981 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
298. Id. § 58.1-3965(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. § 58.1-3965.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). Counties, towns, and cities that do not adopt
such an ordinance may only take such action on December 31 of the second year following
the due date of the delinquent taxes. Id. § 58.1-3965(A) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
302. Id. § 58.1-3228 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
303. Id. § 58.1-3230 to -3231 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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the locality to execute a written agreement establishing the time
period that the property must remain within the applicable class
of real estate. °4 The General Assembly also amended Virginia
Code section 58.1-3237 to authorize localities that adopt a sliding
scale ordinance to impose rollback taxes0 5 at a specified rate."0 6
304 Id. § 58.1-3234(3) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
305. Rollback taxes are additional taxes imposed on real estate that is changed to a
nonqualified or more intensive use. Id. § 58.1-3237(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
306. Id. § 58.1-3237(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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